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xABSTRACT
Zhijie Li. MSECE, Purdue University, May 2017. A Hybrid Peer-to-Peer Framework
for Supply Chain Visibility. Major Professor: Zina Ben Miled.
Current supply chain information systems are transaction-based and suffer from
lack of real-time transparency. Furthermore, they are often centralized and therefore
cannot adequately scale to include a large number of small and medium size com-
panies. This thesis presents a hybrid peer-to-peer supply chain physical distribution
framework (HP3D) that addresses these increasingly critical gaps in a global market.
HP3D leverages the advantages of hybrid networks through flexible peers and a light-
weight index server in order to share supply chain physical distribution information
in pseudo real-time among stakeholders. The architecture of HP3D consists of a hi-
erarchy of dynamic sub-networks that evolve based on market demands and digitize
the transfer of goods between suppliers and customers. These sub-networks are cre-
ated on demand, emulate the end-to-end movement of the shipment and terminate
when the delivery of goods is completed. A variation of blockchain technology is also
proposed in order to increase the security level of the proposed framework.
11. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Global supply chain is a complex and dynamic group of interactions and trade-offs
between suppliers, manufacturing, warehousing, carriers, and customers to deliver the
right product, at the right time, and in the right condition [1]. The data to support
trade-off decisions to maximize profit, not just to minimize costs, are spread across
the global supply chain with ownership of the systems and underlying data varying
based on the type of decision being made. More than 20 years ago the electronic data
interchange (EDI) standard enabled the automated electronic document exchange
between supply chain trading partners. Later, Supply Chain Operating Networks
(SCONs) emerged to enable global transactions across members of the trading net-
work based on the movement of goods. On the one hand, SCONs have brought added
value to supply chain by enabling electronic data exchange. On the other hand, this
added value became directly proportional to the level of participation by a given in-
dustry sector in a given SCON. Therefore, companies venturing into new industries
or markets were forced to support multiple SCONs often leading to inefficiencies and
high costs [2].
This thesis addresses the above limitations through a cost-effective, main stream
and open peer-to-peer solution.
1.2 Supply Chains
Supply chain management consists of multiple interacting processes with multiple
stakeholders. A typical supply chain includes eight main processes as identified in [3].
These processes are defined as follows:
21. Customer relation management (CRM): This process covers the relationship
between the supplier and the customer including the stratification of the cus-
tomers in different groups based on their demands, purchase levels and habits.
CRMs document the communication between the supplier and its customers
and maintain a history of this communication. This communication often in-
cludes general marketing campaigns as well as targeted campaigns, in addition
to a record of feedback gathered from the customers with respect to a given
product or product line. CRMs also assign and handle account managers for
high-value customers and are able to facilitate plans for customer sustainment
and satisfaction.
2. Customer service management: This process informs customers or potential
customers about the different products including pricing, availability, shipping
dates and enables the customers to track the status of their orders.
3. Demand management: This process allows the company to plan procurement,
production and distribution based on forecasted market demands. While the
first two processes manage the relationship with the customer, demand manage-
ment is concerned with the ability of the supplier to fulfill customer demands
though appropriate planning of its own procurement of raw material, production
or manufacturing of the final product.
4. Order Fulfillment: This process is concerned with the distribution and delivery
of the final product to the customer. It starts with the handling of the placement
of the order by to customer and ends with the delivery of the goods to customer.
In addition to the placement of the order and payment handling, a major sub-
process of order fulfillment involves the logistics network that is responsible
for the transport of the goods from the supplier to the customer. The specific
focus of this thesis is on this sub-process which is defined in supply chain as the
physical distribution of goods.
35. Manufacturing management: This process is also internal to the company and
consists of a mapping between forecasted market demands and the ability of the
manufacturer to adapt to these demands through manufacturing plant configu-
ration subject to resource constraints. Several strategies may be used to drive
this mapping including, for example, shifting resources from one production line
to another.
6. Supplier relation management: This process covers the interactions of a com-
pany with its suppliers. Maintaining alternate lists of suppliers, product pricing
and order lead times allows manufacturers to balance the risks of manufacturing
delays against excess or stagnant inventories.
7. Product Development: This process is concerned with a sustained strategy for
the development of new products and enhancement of current products as well
as the reduction of time-to-market for these products. Time-to-market delays
usually translate to increased product costs and loss of market shares.
8. Returns management: The goal of this process is to minimize the number of
product returns from customers. This entails documenting policies and regula-
tions associated with each product and categorizing the reasons for returns as
well as implementing procedures for handling product returns.
Information systems have been developed during the last two decades to support
the above processes. These information systems evolved from isolated standalone
applications to integrated systems. For example, customer resource management
systems (CRMs) are now widely available and deployed in many companies. These
systems are able to handle both customer relation management as well as customer
service management processes. CRMs are also integrated with Enterprise Resource
Planning (ERP) information systems. ERPs encapsulate several core and support
processes within an organization including demand management, order fulfillment,
manufacturing management, supplier relation management, product development,
4and returns management. These processes cross the boundaries of various depart-
ments in an organization and provide a solution for an automated information flow
that is mapped onto the functionalities associated with each department. For in-
stance, the accounts payable department is involved in all the aspects of the chain
including supplier relation management, product development, and returns manage-
ment. Similarly, the accounts receivable department is involved with the customer
resource management and customer service management.
The integration between ERPs and CRMs allows the information flow underlying
the processes in an organization to extend to both its customers and its suppliers.
Additionally, digital market places are now available for the exchange of this informa-
tion across multiple companies thereby facilitating electronic trading. Indeed, Supply
Chains Operating Networks (SCONs) have emerged as models for these exchanges
and have facilitated the exchange of documents and information between trading
partners including purchase orders, payment orders, bill of lading, delivery notes, etc.
While the above information systems have led to significant advances in the au-
tomation of the supply chain processes, they still have some limitations. The auto-
mated workflow embodied in the ERPs, CRMs and SCONs are able to support the
timely delivery of information in both direction from the supplier to the customer
as well as from the customer to the supplier. However, the increasing complexity of
the supply chain, which is primarily due to the involvement of multiple parties, has
started to highlight the inefficiencies of these state-of-the-art information systems.
Inefficiencies can be observed in the ability of small and medium companies to pene-
trate new markets because of the cost associated with their participation in multiple
SCONs.
Other inefficiencies are related to the real-time delivery of field information during
the execution of the physical distribution segment of the order fulfillment process.
The physical distribution segment is the sub-process associated with the transport of
goods from the supplier to the customer. This leg of the supply chain involves other
parties including carriers, brokers and freight forwarders. A given order is considered
5fulfilled by the supplier when it reaches its destination (i.e., the customer). Both the
customer and the supplier are fully committed to the timely delivery of the goods
because the customer needs the goods for its own supply chain and the supplier’s
payment is contingent on the delivery. Moreover, some of these goods may have high
value or are associated with high risks and, therefore, visibility during the physical
distribution phase is necessary in order to allow both customers and suppliers to
take timely remedial action as and when needed. For example, the goods may be
hazardous material whose transportation is under strict policies requiring additional
insurance fees. The goods can also be medical equipment (e.g., implants) needed for
a surgery or can be packaging material that needs to be delivered in time to ensure
the appropriate packaging of a new batch of manufactured drugs by a pharmaceutical
company.
The above scenarios show the importance for both supplier and customer to have
exact knowledge of the location of their goods during shipment. However, once it
leaves the supplier premises, the shipment is often handled by a third party, the
carrier. Field information during the transportation segment is often relayed by the
carrier through a back office communication. That is, the truck carrying the goods
would need to communicate his location back to his home office. This information
is then shared with the customer and the supplier. Unfortunately, this flow of in-
formation is often not performed in a timely and efficient manner making delays in
information sharing with stakeholders a common practice. The focus of this thesis
is to provide a solution that improves visibility for the supplier and the customer
during the physical distribution phase of the supply chain. Moreover, the solution is
cost-effective and scalable in order to accommodate the participation of an increasing
number of small and medium companies.
61.3 Proposed System
The supply chain is an end-to-end process for the delivery of goods from a manu-
facturer to a customer. As mentioned above, it includes different processes that call
for the interaction of different trading partners (e.g., demand planning, order fulfill-
ment, etc.). This thesis focuses specifically on one process of the supply chain and
presents an efficient, scalable and fault tolerant framework that provides real-time
visibility in the physical distribution sub-process of the supply chain. The features of
the proposed framework include:
– An event-based approach that leverages advances in sensor technology and the
growing trend of Internet of Things (IoT).
– A hybrid peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture that can be dynamically customized
to accommodate a scalable number of both small and medium companies.
– An architecture that is fault-tolerant because it minimizes potential for single
point of failure and efficiently manages network traffic.
– A blockchain-enabled security approach that increases the validity and trust
level of the proposed system.
The proposed hybrid P2P physical distribution framework (HP3D) is a seamless,
plug-and-play, standardized digital integration system across the different stakehold-
ers of the supply chain network. It delivers the pseudo real-time status of each ship-
ment throughout the physical distribution process of the supply chain to the trading
partners.
Each peer application is modular and consists of three tiers which is aimed at sim-
plifying the development of the application and enhancing its maintainability. Fur-
thermore, in order to enhance the security level of the system, an enhanced blockchain
model is proposed. This model combines the concepts of a public ledger and private
sub-ledgers in order to increase the privacy and trust levels in the system.
7Chapter 2 of the thesis reviews several software architectures and current supply
chain information management systems. Chapter 3 is a review of cryptographic tools
and their use in the blockchain model. Chapter 4 discusses the design of the proposed
HP3D framework including the underlying software architecture and event handling
mechanisms. A blockchain-based model for HP3D is also introduced in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 describes the implementation of the proposed framework and demonstrates
the use of HP3D for relevant test case scenarios. Chapter 6 outlines directions for
future work and summarizes the contributions of this thesis.
82. SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE
The industry is at a tipping point, where efficient networks are being established to
enable step changes in efficiency and interoperability of supply chains across several
industries. Current supply chain management systems primarily rely on centralized
supply chain operating networks (SCONs) [4] and the electronic data interchange
(EDI) [5] standard. Examples leading edge systems include E2Open [6] and SAP [7].
However, these systems lack cost-effective solutions for real-time transparency in the
distribution phase of the supply chain and in particular with respect to the transport
segment of this phase.
This chapter includes a review of previous related work by other researchers and
highlights the various software models that have been used in supply chain manage-
ment systems.
2.1 Client-Server Architecture
The client-server architecture is a network architecture where each node in the
network consists of a computing device that is either a client or a server. The role
of the server is to respond to requests from the clients and therefore it may need
extended resources in terms of processing power, memory, network bandwidth and
disk storage. The client in the client-server network issues the requests and presents
the responses back to the user. The client-server architecture is the most commonly
used service-oriented software architecture. Nearly all web services are based on this
model. This architecture has the advantages associated with a centralized manage-
ment and control. For instance, managing software updates to the server node is
handled in one central location. Furthermore, access to the server by the clients can
also be controlled through a single point in the architecture. However, it suffers from
9limited scalability which is constrained by the server resources. Furthermore, the
client-server architecture also suffers from an asymmetric distribution of resources
and a direction-biased communication [8]. Indeed, the server is responsible for pro-
cessing all client requests and therefore must have high capacity and high availability.
This high capacity is delivered through large storage, powerful CPUs and superior
network bandwidth. High availability is delivered through the replication of these
resources using for example an additional fail-over or standby server. The client, on
the other hand, is usually thin with far less resources. That is most of the processing
is performed on the server and only limited processing is performed by the client. The
client can, for instance, be a simple web application that captures user queries and
displays the results. The interactions between the clients and the server in the client-
server architecture are also asymmetric as they are always initiated by the client and
serviced by the server which is constantly listening for inbound client requests [8].
In summary, the main disadvantages of the client-server architecture include fault-
tolerance, limited scalability, and increased maintenance cost. For instance, the server
can be targeted by cyber-attacks or be subject to power outages and hardware failures
making it unavailable to service requests from the clients. The server has to also
accommodate an increasing number of clients which may necessitate regular compute
and network capacity upgrades. Lastly, the server in a client-server model has a high
maintenance cost because of its 24/7 mode of operation.
2.2 Peer-to-Peer
The peer-to-peer architecture is a network architecture where all nodes in the
network have equivalent roles and privileges. Peers or nodes in the network cooperate
in order to service each others requests through distributed resource sharing. The
peer-to-peer architecture is an emerging distributed architecture that is commonly
used for file sharing (e.g., video and audio content). This architecture addresses
some of the limitations of the client-server model by decentralizing the processing of
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the services. Several well-known software applications use this architecture. These
include bitcoin [9], bittorrent [10], Napster [11] and Skype [12]. In general, the peer-
to-peer architecture can be classified into three main categories:
• Pure peer-to-peer: This unstructured network is formed by nodes that randomly
connect to each others without a predefined hierarchy. This architecture does
not include a centralized data or control flow manager and all exchanges are
handled by the peers using message forwarding. Gnutella is an example of an
unstructured peer-to-peer application [13].
• Hierarchical peer-to-peer: This model was adopted by Skype. Unlike the pure
peer-to-peer architecture, the model includes a hierarchy of regular nodes and
supernodes. Supernodes are selected among the peers with higher resources.
They are assigned a group of peers and are responsible for establishing and man-
aging the communication within their assigned group of peers. Communication
between two peers in different groups is established through the supernodes of
the respective groups.
• Hybrid peer-to-peer: This model combines the features of the pure peer-to-peer
and the client-server architectures [14]. It includes a lightweight server that
allows peers to lookup the IP address of other peers in the network by using
the ID of the target peer. The supply chain framework proposed in this thesis
uses this architecture.
2.2.1 Pure peer-to-peer
The unstructured characteristic of the pure peer-to-peer network makes it highly
robust especially when a large number of peers dynamically join or leave the network.
However, this characteristic also presents disadvantages. For instance the network is
vulnerable to broadcast storm: an excessive network traffic caused by a large number
11
of redundant messages especially in a highly connected network [15]. This can occur,
when a search query cannot be quickly serviced by nearby peers and as a result the
query is forwarded to a large number of nodes.
As previously mentioned, Gnutella [16] is an example of an unstructured P2P
network. It is dedicated to online file sharing. The message exchange mechanism used
in Gnutella is called flooding technique [16] where each peer forwards the request to
all neighboring peers until the requested file is found. This technique is efficient for
the distribution of common files that are held by the majority of peers. However,
when the file is rare and only available within few peers, searching for it can lead to
a broadcast storm.
2.2.2 Hierarchical peer-to-peer
In a hierarchical peer-to-peer network model, a set of nodes are designated as
supernodes based on their high capacity of network or hardware resources. The peers
are thus organized into a hierarchy consisting of two classes: supernodes and ordinary
nodes [12]. The supernode stores the information of all nearby peers. An example
implementation of this model is Skype. The selection of supernodes in Skype is based
on geolocation and network resources.
Each supernode in the hierarchical peer-to-peer model is associated with a group
of ordinary nodes. Once the supernodes are selected, they maintain a structured
overlay network of the ordinary nodes assigned to their group. An ordinary node
sends requests to its assigned supernode. Once the request is accepted, the issuing
node and the servicing node establish a direct communication channel [12].
The hierarchical peer-to-peer network structure is less robust than the unstruc-
tured peer-to-peer network as each supernode must maintain a list of information
related to the ordinary nodes in its group. Moreover, the communication channel
between a supernode and an ordinary node can become a bottleneck.
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2.2.3 Hybrid peer-to-peer
The hybrid peer-to-peer network model can be viewed as the combination of the
peer-to-peer and the client-server models. This architecture consist of an index server
and the nodes. The index server is a lightweight server and allows the nodes to request
the IP address of the other nodes in the network. Once the IP of the target peer is
retrieved, connection is directly established between any source-target pair of nodes.
The server in the hybrid peer-to-peer network is labeled lightweight because of the
simple functionalities underlying its software application. Indeed, this application is
limited to a) receiving queries from the nodes in the network consisting of the ID of a
target node, b) retrieving the corresponding IP from the index server’s local database
and c) returning the response back to the node that issued the query. Example
applications that use this model include Spotify [17], bittorrent and Napster. Spotify
is a peer-to-peer music sharing software application. The application is supported by
two main data centers. A node uniformly chooses which data center to connect to.
Each data center has an independent peer-to-peer overlay network. There are two
different ways of finding a particular node in the network. The first uses a tracker
deployed in the Spotify server and the second consists of issuing a query over the
overlay network. For the first mechanism, the sever holds a table that associates a
music file with a user. If another user is searching for a given music file, he/she needs
to lookup the user who holds this file through the above mentioned table. It will
then establish a connection with that user. This mechanism guarantees that there is
no broadcast storm in the network. However, the server may become a bottleneck
during high network traffic. Therefore, this method is suitable for small number of
inquiries to which the server can quickly respond.
2.3 Supply Chain Information Systems
E2Open [6] and SAP [7] are examples of cutting edge supply chain information
management systems. These software applications are cloud-based. They also pro-
13
vide well-developed transaction-based functionalities that support the exchange of
shipment information and documents between trading partners. Given that current
business environments have a large amount of traffic and numerous stakeholders, a
centralized, cloud-based solution may become inefficient with respect to both scalabil-
ity and affordability. The latter limitation is a major barrier for small and medium-
sized companies. The HP3D system proposed in this thesis is based on a hybrid
peer-to-peer architecture and attempts to address both of these limitations.
Current supply chain information systems also use the electronic data interchange
(EDI) [5] standard as a common format for the messages being exchanged by the part-
ners in the network. HP3D uses this standard in order to maintain interoperability
with existing systems.
14
3. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND BLOCKCHAIN
Internet and information technology usage is increasingly penetrating every aspect
of our daily lives. As a consequence, we are becoming progressively more and more
exposed to computer and network security breaches. Computer security, also known
as cyber security or IT security, is a field of research that focuses on the protection of
computer or network systems from attacks that may materialize in the theft or damage
to the hardware, the software or the data [18]. Because of these potential threats and
associated damages, researchers have been focusing on computer and data security.
As a result, numerous cryptography mechanisms [19] such as digital signatures and
encryption algorithms were proposed. More recently, data security has been gaining
importance and became a significant component of computer security. Data security
can be viewed from different aspects including integrity and confidentiality and there
are several approaches that are used to enhance data security. This chapter reviews
the cryptographic tools that are relevant to the proposed system.
3.1 Cryptographic Tools
Cryptography is a collection of mathematical or programing methods that can
protect data integrity and confidentiality. Different cryptographic tools have different
features. For example, a cryptographic hash function can enhance data integrity and
an encryption algorithm can maintain data confidentiality.
3.1.1 Integrity
Data integrity is concerned with two different aspects, data itself and its sender.
Bishop [20] defines data integrity as the trustworthiness of data and/or sources. To
15
maintain data integrity, the recipient has to be able to verify that the data was not
modified during transmission. In addition, the recipient must be able to ascertain
that the sender specified in the data package is the same as the actual sender. Mech-
anisms for maintaining data integrity fall under two main categories: prevention and
detection. Prevention mechanisms focus on preventing an unauthorized user from
modifying the data. Detection mechanisms do not attempt to prevent data modifi-
cation during transmission, but instead report to the user when the data has been
altered. For the purpose of this thesis, we are focusing on detection mechanisms since
the network underlying the proposed system is public. The methods used in the pro-
posed system to maintain data integrity include cryptographic hashing and digital
signature both of which are discussed later in this chapter.
3.1.2 Confidentiality
Confidentiality can be defined as keeping the information contained in the data
accessible only to authorized users. The data is public while it is being transmitted
through the Internet. Mechanism are available to enable the sender to “scramble”
all the bits in the data thus making it unreadable. The receiver can apply a reverse
operation to reproduce the readable data from the “scrambled” data. In this context,
“readable” implies the ability to interpret data in some meaningful way. The proce-
dure of ”scrambling” the data bits is called encryption. Re-producing readable data
is called decryption. Usually encryption and decryption require a key which can be
either symmetric or asymmetric.
3.1.3 Terminology
In order to describe different cryptographic mechanisms, the definitions of domain-
specific terms are introduced below:
• Plain-text refers to the text that is ”readable”. In other words, the information
that is carried in the text can be easily interpreted.
16
• Encryption is the process of ”scrambling” the bits in the plain-text in order
to make the data ”unreadable” without knowledge of the associated secret. In
modern cryptography system, the secret usually refers to a cryptographic key
used in the encryption process.
• Cipher-text is produced by an encryption process. The information carried in
the text cannot be easily interpreted by someone who does not have access to
the secret/key.
• Decryption is the reverse operation of encryption. It is the process that re-
constructs the plain-text (meaningful data) from a given cipher-text (”scram-
bled” data).
With the above definitions, we can mathematically describe the cryptographic
operations of interest. Let M denote the plain-text, C denote the cipher-text and K
denote the security key. Given an encryption function/algorithm Ek(), the cipher-text
C can be generated from the plain-text M by using the equation below:
C = Ek(M) (3.1)
Similarly, given the decryption function/algorithm Dk() the plain-text is derived
from the cipher-text using the following equation:
M = Dk(C) (3.2)
3.1.4 Public Key Cryptography
A secret key is needed in order to perform both encryption and decryption. Ini-
tially, we assume that there is no key shared between two entities. A key issue is
the distribution of the key to each involved entity without revealing it to external
parties. The Deffie-Hellem Key Exchange protocol is the first and most well-known
key exchange agreement [21] that addresses this issue. In the prototype of the pro-
posed framework, the Deffie-Hellem protocol is used to exchange a key between a
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mobile device or another device that need to be authorized (i.e., a peer) and the
index server as shown in Figure 3.1. Other more elaborate key exchange mechanisms
are available such as RSA [20]. The use of the Deffie-Hellem mechanism as part of
the implementation of HP3D is for illustration purposes. It can be easily replaced by
other mechanisms that may be available through advanced public key infrastructures.
User a 
Phase 1 
Public key P, g 
Randomly choose X 
Xa = gX mod P 
Phase 2 
Exchange Xa and Yb 
Phase 3 
Ksec = (Y blx mod P = gXY mod P
Phase 1 
Public key P, g 
Randomly choose Y 
yb = g
Y mod p
Phase 2 
Exchange Xa and Yb 
Phase 3 
Ksec = {Xa)Y mod P = gXY mod P
User b 
Fig. 3.1. Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
The exchange starts with a public key (i.e., a publicly known key) which consists
of two parts: a prime number P and a generator g. This key needs to have certain
properties in order to ensure that the protocol is secure. First, the number of bits in
P should meet the length requirements stated in [22]. Second, the generator g has to
be within the range 1 to P-1 and has to satisfy the following:
∀ X ∈ [1, P − 1], ∃ i ∈ [0, P − 1] | X = gi mod P (3.3)
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Based on the above setup, users a and b can generate random numbers denoted
by X and Y, respectively. The first phase of the protocol starts by calculating two
numbers Xa and Yb using the following equations:
Xa = g
X mod P (3.4)
Yb = g
Y mod P (3.5)
In the second phase, the two users exchange Xa and Yb. The third phase consists
of users a and b calculating the shared secret key, Ksec, independently by performing:
Ksec = Y
X
b mod P = g
XY mod P (3.6)
Ksec = X
Y
a mod P = g
XY mod P (3.7)
This calculation will allow the users a and b to have access to the same secret key,
Ksec. Both users have the same public key P and g. The secrete key, Ksec, can then
be written as (gX mod P )Y mod P or (gY mod P )X mod P and both expressions
can be simplified to gXY mod P [21] as shown in Equation (3.7).
A possible external attack on this algorithm is to eavesdrop on the connection
between a and b, in order to capture the values of Xa and Yb. Since the adversary
also has access to the public key P and g, a brute force approach can be used to
determine the values of X and Y by calculating:
vari = g
i mod P ∀ i ∈ [0, P − 1] (3.8)
The adversary can try different values of i until he/she finds a vari that is the
same as Xa or Yb. Once this is performed, i is established as the value of either X or
Y. The adversary can then perform the same operation as a or b to find the secret
key, Ksec. If the prime number P is large enough, the brute force method becomes
impractical. Indeed, given Xa, Yb, P and g, solving g
XY mod P is called the discrete
logarithm problem [19] which is considered a hard problem.
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Fig. 3.2. Data Encryption Standard(DES)
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol can only distribute a symmetric key to
both sender and recipient of the information exchange. The other aspect of data con-
fidentiality consists of the encryption/decryption of the information being exchanged
using the key. For this purpose, and again for illustration purposes, we use the Data
Encryption Standard (DES) which was adopted in 1977 by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology(NIST) [21]. Other encryption mechanisms that offer
higher levels of security are available (e.g., 3 DES [23]). DES is used in the imple-
mentation in order to illustrate the use of encryption and decryption in the HP3D
prototype. DES is considered as a block cipher algorithm which means that the al-
gorithm breaks the data in to small blocks and encrypts each block individually and
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then concatenates all of the blocks together. The recipient has to decrypt the data
in the same manner. The block size can be 64-bits and the key length 56-bits. The
encryption process for each block in this case is shown in Figure 3.2. There are a total
of 16 rounds in each encryption. During each round, the algorithm breaks the data
into two halves: left and right. Furthermore, for each round a round-key is generated
using the original key. A substitution is performed on the left half of the data. This is
done by applying the round function F() to the right half of the data. Subsequently,
an exclusive-OR is performed on the output of the round function and the left half
of the data. The round function has the same structure in every round. However,
it uses a different round-key in order to “scramble” the data to the highest extent
possible. The two halves of data are interchanged at the end of each round.
3.1.5 Digital Signature
Digital signatures and cryptographic hash functions are used in the proposed
system in order to maintain data integrity. Digital signature is used to maintain
the integrity of the source of the data. The authenticity of the sender is verified by
examining the corresponding signature.
There are several types of digital signature scheme. RSA [20] and Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [24] are two examples of popular public key
digital signature methods. RSA is used to verify the sender by using the sender’s
public key. In order to setup RSA, several parameters are needed. First, two prime
numbers P and Q are selected at random. Let n = PQ, the Euler totient function of
n is defined as:
φ(n) = (P − 1)(Q− 1) (3.9)
This function corresponds to the number of elements from 1 to n-1 that have the
greatest common divisor with n equal to 1. Two additional random numbers α and
β are selected and must satisfy the following equation:
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αβ ≡ 1 mod φ(n) (3.10)
The public key can be defined as either Kpub= (n, β) or Kpub = (n, α). In this
context, the parameters P, Q and α (or β) are secret and constitute the private key
Kpriv. A signature of a give message M can be generated by the following equation:
SigM = sig(M,Kpriv) = M
α mod n (3.11)
The verification process can, in turn, be performed as follows:
ver(SigM , Kpub) = SigM
β mod n (3.12)
The signature is only accepted when ver(SigM,Kpub) = M. Therefore, the adversary
cannot produce the same message signature unless he/she knows the private key,
Kpriv. Producing the private key using the public key can be split into two different
problems: discrete logarithm problem and factoring problem [19]. Both are classified
as hard problems.
3.2 Supply Chain Security and Blockchain
A number of cryptographic and security models have been proposed for secur-
ing the supply chain. Some have focused on protecting the content of the load (i.e.,
containers), such as in [25]. Other secure multi-party computations models focused
on e-auctions and required additional communication rounds that were computation-
ally intensive [26]. Many have proposed using RFID in their supply chain protocol.
However, this latter approach can impact privacy [27] [28] [29] and often introduces
additional difficulties, such as the need to re-encrypt data which subsequently makes
information tracking problematic. The goal of the proposed system is to support the
integrity of the physical distribution phase of supply chain, protect shipment custody
information, and provide means for the tracking of this custody in a scalable, secure
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and reliable way, all the while protecting the privacy of the participants. Towards this
purpose, we have developed a new cryptography model based on the block chain [30]
technology.
At the core of the blockchain [30] technology is a distributed public ledger with
two types of transactions: a single genesis transaction which creates value and a
transfer transaction that transfers value from one party to another. In the blockchain
taxonomy, this latter transaction is called a smart contract. Each transaction is
digitally signed by the issuer and posted to the public ledger. A group of transactions
are then collected into a block, the block is validated by a third party (a miner) and
is locked. This mechanism represents the strength of the blockchain technology. Each
block in the chain is immutable since it is linked to its predecessor and any change
to any of the blocks invalidates all the blocks downstream in the chain. Furthermore,
the more mature the block is (i.e., the longer it has been in the public ledger chain),
the greater is its integrity.
Each peer participating in the network keeps a copy of the public ledger and every
time a new block is created, it is broadcasted to all the peers that add it to their
local copy of the ledger. In general, participation in the public ledger is anonymous
as each party is identified by a digital ID. From a business perspective, issuers and
beneficiaries are encouraged to participate in the ledger because of this anonymity,
in addition to the lack of a central controlling party, reduced transaction fees and
the real-time execution of the transactions. Miners are also incentivized because they
receive a fee for every block they validate.
Despite the level of protection in the traditional blockchain, the approach is
plagued with an increasing level of criticism. While the approach is attractive be-
cause of its underlying freedom of trade and anti-regulation, it makes risk/flexibility
trade-offs hard to manage. For instance participants are not protected against mining
of the public ledger for trends and transaction patterns.
Bitcoin [9] was the first decentralized digital currency and one of the most wildly
known application of the blockchain technology. Bitcoin is based on a peer-to-peer
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architecture and allows online payments to be sent directly from one party to another
without going through a financial institution. In Bitcoin, a public ledger and a proof-
of-work concepts are used to ensure the integrity of the transactions and to incentive
the miners. Transactions are chained and stored in the public ledger. Every peer has a
copy of the public ledger, and every update to the ledger is broadcasted to all peers in
the network. Moreover, every transaction is verified by one of the peers in the network
(i.e., miner). When a transaction is posted, the miner will back track the chain of
transactions in order to find the sender’s latest balance. The transaction is deemed
valid when the last balance is greater than the current transfer amount. Once this is
confirmed, the miner chains the transaction to the previous transaction by calculating
a hash value for the current transaction using the previous transaction’s hash value.
This verification process is called the proof of work which is also used to time-stamp
the transactions. Multiple miners can attempt to verify a single transaction. The
miner who finishes the verification the first will receive the associated reward in the
form of a transaction fee [9]. A variation of the blockchain technology is used to
support the transfer of information in the proposed HP3D framework. This aspect
along with the design of HP3D are discussed in the next chapter.
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4. SYSTEM DESIGN
The architecture of the proposed HP3D supply chain framework is shown in Fig
4.1. It is based on a collection of purpose-centric customized sub-networks that can
be configured dynamically in real-time. This is a departure from the traditional
transaction-based SCONs or ERP systems. HP3D allows stakeholders to share infor-
mation related to a given shipment and provide them with pseudo real-time visibility
in the physical distribution segment of the supply chain.
Fig. 4.1. System Architecture
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The network model adopted in HP3D is based on the hybrid peer-to-peer ar-
chitecture. Previous projects successfully used the hybrid P2P model for selected
applications in other sectors. For instance, the model was used to share music among
different peers [11]. In the proposed HP3D, the P2P network allows any registered
user to enroll in the system. Once the user is registered, he/she has the ability to
dynamically establish sub-networks with trading partners. The software architecture
that enables this ability is described in this chapter.
4.1 Architecture
The overall architecture of the system contains several components namely index
server, node, administrative node and external monitor. The roles of these compo-
nents in the system are discussed next:
• Index server: the role of the index server is to dynamically collect and share
the IP addresses of the peers. This server is lightweight and does not partici-
pate in the data exchanges between peers. The index server is responsible for
providing the IP address of the target peer to the requesting peer. In order for
the server to maintain this information up-to-date, it is designed to receive a
heartbeat message from active peers at regular intervals. The rate of the heart-
beat message can be adjusted depending on whether access is being performed
from a mobile device or computer. The index server processes this heartbeat
message and updates the corresponding peer’s information. In order to make
the index server lightweight, all types of requests have been designed to reduce
the involvement of the index server in the communication among peers as well
as reduce the size of the messages being exchanged between the index server
and the peers.
• Peer: A peer is the most common node in the system. It can be a mobile device
or a desktop computer. Shipment update messages are shared among these
peers. While each of the peers can assume a different role for each individual
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shipment, all peers have a unified architecture. A given peer may assume more
than one role with respect to different shipments. For instance, a carrier in one
shipment can also be a customer in another shipment.
• Administrative node: In general, peers are expected to have limited resources.
However, one of the peers must be designated as the interface with the in-house
ERP and would therefore need extended processing and storage resources. This
peer is labeled “administrative node”. Each partner will have a designated
administrative node. This node interacts with the enterprise resource planning
system (ERP) of the partner and is able to retrieve order information and
warehouse sensor information. In addition, it participates in all the shipment-
centric sub-networks associated with a given partner. As such, it is able to
act as a persistent record for all messages related to shipments involving the
corresponding partner. One of the main motivation for the administrative node
is its function as a data source when active peers drop out of the sub-network.
For instance, if a peer experiences a loss of connectivity, once it reconnects, it
can retrieve the most recent shipment updates from the administrative node in
its organization.
• External monitor: The external monitor is mainly responsible for the posting
of the geolocation data to the semi-public ledger which is used to track the
shipment location in the proposed HP3D.
4.2 Support Processes
During the design phase, few processes have been identified to enable the informa-
tion flow in HP3D. These processes consist of three core processes and three support
processes. This section discusses the support processes. Before shipment information
can be shared among peers, the shipment-centric sub-network has to be established.
That is, peers need to know information about other peers that are involved in the
same shipment. This information is normally included in a purchase order which is is-
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sued by the customer’s ERP system and shared with the other trading partners. The
administrative node of the customer will retrieve the purchase order from the cus-
tomer’s ERP and use the information to establish the shipment-centric sub-network.
Once the network is established, peers can send shipment update information to
each other. This process is labeled query IP Address and involves querying the index
server about the IP address of other peers. The workflow of the query IP Address
process is shown in Fig 4.2
Fig. 4.2. Query IP Address Process
A peer initiates the process by sending the index server the ID of the target peer.
When the index server receives the ID, its searches its local database for the corre-
sponding peer IP. The index server will reply to the requesting peer with a 0.0.0.0 IP
address, if the target peer ID does not exist in the database. Otherwise, the index
server will compare the timestamp of the target peer with the current system time. It
will reply with 1.1.1.1 IP address to the peer if the difference between these two times
is greater than some preset threshold indicating that the target peer is not active. If
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the target peer is active, the index server replies with the desired target peer’s IP
address. This support process is used in all exchanges including any kind of shipment
update messages.
Fig. 4.3. Mobile Verification Process
In order to keep unauthorized users from joining the network, an authentication
method is needed. The mobile verification process enables the identification of a
valid mobile device when it joins the network. The focus in this case is on mobile
devices, since desktops and other connected devices may be authenticated through
their organizational infrastructure. The mobile verification process uses the IMEI
number to identify a mobile device. This number is unique for every device. It
is further assumed that the index server has prior knowledge of the IMEI numbers
of valid mobile devices (e.g., stored in the index server’s local database during the
registration).
The mobile verification process consists of two different sub-processes. The first
sub-process is a key exchange protocol and the second sub-process is the validation
of the IMEI number of the mobile device. The mobile verification routine is shown in
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Fig 4.3. Assuming that the mobile device and the index server have exchanged the
necessary keys to secure the subsequent exchange of information, the mobile device
will retrieve its IMEI number and encrypt it. The encrypted IMEI number is then
sent to the index server. The index sever decrypts the IMEI number and use the
number to search its local database. The mobile device will be identified as valid only
when the IMEI number is registered in the index server’s database. The index server
generates an ID for the mobile device and returns it to the mobile device if the device
is valid. If the device is not found in the database, an error is generated. However,
no message is returned to the issuing device in order to prevent the index server from
being overloaded with erroneous or malicious requests.
4.3 Core Processes
The proposed HP3D has three core processes namely heartbeat message, local
sensor message and GPS update. The heartbeat message is sent by the active nodes
in the network. The workflow of this process is shown in Fig 4.4.
Fig. 4.4. Heartbeat Message Process
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An active node sends the index server its ID. The index server will retrieve the
current system time and update the node’s timestamp in the database. The heartbeat
message is sent by each node in the network periodically with an adjustable rate in
order to fit both resource and time delay requirements.
The second core process is related to the sharing of internal sensor information
with trading partners. Companies may have sensors internal to their local operation
that they may be willing to share with their trading partners (e.g., sensors in the
loading points). The administrative node in the company is responsible for the acqui-
sition of these signals and for broadcasting the related messages to the other nodes in
each shipment-specific sub-network. Fig 4.5 shows the workflow of the internal sensor
update process.
Fig. 4.5. Internal Sensor Update Process
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The internal update message is generated by the administrative node in a company
and sent to the corresponding nodes in the company. The nodes will update their local
database and also broadcast the message to other nodes involved in the shipment. In
order to do so, the nodes will query the index server for the most up-to-date IP address
of other nodes. After querying the index server, the node will send the update message
to those valid IP addresses returned by the index server. This process is important,
for example, for the supplier to notify the carrier when a shipment is ready to be
picked up, since the internal sensor can only be accessed by the administrative node
of the supplier.
The third core process is the GPS update process which allows the trading partners
to share the geolocation status of a shipment. This process relies on the blockchain
technology. The workflow starts with a node querying the semi-public ledger which
is maintained by the monitors. The external monitor will search its local database
for the target truck ID and reply to the requesting node with the latest geolocation
update of the corresponding truck. In order to broadcast the update message to the
trading partners, the node will first query the index server about the target nodes’
most recent IP addresses using their IDs. The node will then send the update message
to all valid IP addresses that are returned by index server. The recipient nodes will in
turn update their local database once they receive the update message. The recipient
nodes include the administrative node which also receives the message and updates
its own local database.
As mentioned earlier, the GPS update in the proposed design is done by the ex-
ternal monitors. However, due to implementation time constraints, the GPS update
process is being emulated in a laboratory environment by using a mobile GPS emu-
lator application developed for testing purposes. The mobile GPS emulator acts as
an external monitor with few differences. For instance, instead of a node querying
the external monitors, the GPS emulator will periodically send GPS updates to one
of the nodes in the shipment-centric sub-network (e.g., carrier). The node will then
broadcast the updated GPS information to the other nodes.
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Fig. 4.6. GPS Update Process
4.4 Cryptographic Blockchain Model
Despite the availability of the verification routine which prevents unauthorized
user from accessing the network, few security issues still remain in the proposed
HP3D. For example, the truck driver can fake the geolocation information by using
a GPS spoofing software. In order to overcome these issues, an enhanced model that
uses external monitors and the blockchain technology is introduced.
Each shipment-centric sub-network will have a sub-ledger that is private to the
trading partners. In addition, the framework relies on a semi-public distributed ledger
that is maintained by external monitors. External monitors have been previously
proposed by others (e.g., Blockfreight [31]). In order to improve the trust level of the
blockchain-based framework, the semi-public ledger in the proposed model contains
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the geolocation information associated with the trucks during the transport phase of
the shipment. It can only be updated by external monitors. Furthermore, each of
the monitors has a pre-distributed public key and private key pair. Any record that
is posted to the semi-public ledger is signed by the monitor using his/her private key.
The records can be verified using the corresponding public key. Using this protocol,
an external monitor can update the geolocation information of a given truck in the
semi-public ledger by broadcasting the information to all external monitors in the
network.
While the semi-public ledger is common to all shipments. Every shipment is
associated with a unique private sub-ledger. This sub-ledger contains shipment infor-
mation including supplier, customer, carrier as well as packing list and the ID of the
truck associated with the shipment. The private ledger is only readable and writable
by the trading partners for the specific shipment thereby protecting the privacy of
the partners.
In the traditional blockchain model, blocks consist of transactions. However, in
the proposed model, for both the semi-public ledger and sub-ledgers, blocks consist
of different types of events. These ledgers include three types of events as shown in
Table 4.1:
• Genesis event: This is the event that starts a new shipment. It corresponds
to the delivery note and essentially establishes the supplier as the custodian of
the shipment. The event also includes the shipment ID, a timestamp, supplier
location and the beneficiary. The format of the data is based on the EDI 214
standard.
• Custody event: An event that documents the current custody of the shipment.
This custody can remain the same or indicate a transfer from one party to
another (e.g., from Dow, the supplier to Carrier Inc., the Carrier). In a custody
event, the timestamp and geolocation refer to the status of the shipment when
the event occurred.
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• Monitoring event: An event based on physical proximity and issued from an
external party which can be an element of the transportation infrastructure
(e.g., a traffic light, toll booth, a future smart road mile marker or another
vehicle). In this thesis, we consider only the case where monitoring events are
issued by users in other vehicles. Future extensions can consider other types of
external monitors.
Table 4.1.
Events types and associated smart custody contracts
Genesis Event
Event: Dow ->Dow
Timestamp: 02/01/2017
Geolocation: Long: X, Lat: Y
BN: Pharma Inc
a) Genesis event if this is the first event or Custody event with no transfer
Custody Event
Event: Dow -> Carrier Inc.
Timestamp: 02/02/2017
Geolocation: Long: X, Lat: Y
BN: Pharma Inc.
b) Custody event with transfer
Monitoring Event
Event: Monitor ID
Timestamp: 02/09/2017
Geolocation: Long: X, Lat: Y
BN: N/A
c) Monitoring event
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The custody events form the shipment-centric sub-ledger which is private to the
supplier, carrier and customer. The monitoring events are submitted by external
monitors to the semi-public distributed ledger. Each event in the sub-ledger is digi-
tally signed by the issuer and a set of events are combined into a block. The block is
then validated by searching in the semi-public ledger for the corresponding truck ID.
Each validated block is shared with the other peers in the shipment-centric subnet-
work and linked to the previous block in the chain thereby creating a custody ledger
chain.
Each party, including external monitors, will have a pair of public-private keys
(e.g., SPUB and SPRIV supplier public and private key, respectively). The private sub-
ledger contains shipment information that is encrypted using a public key agreed upon
by supplier, carrier(s) and customer. These are the only parties that can post to the
sub-ledger which consists entirely of custody events (Table 4.1). Furthermore, each
posted custody event is digitally signed and appropriately encrypted by the issuer.
Fig. 4.7. Cryptographic Model
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Each external monitor will also have a public/private key pair. A potential mech-
anism for generating events can be as follows: When a delivery truck is in the physical
proximity of an external monitor (e.g., another vehicle), a radio communication chan-
nel is established between the truck and the monitor. The monitor will then send a
challenge (a nonce) to the truck, who then signs it with his private key (CPRIV) and
sends the signature back to the monitor. The external monitor verifies the signature
using the truck’s public key (CPUB). She will then sign the current geolocation of the
truck using her private key (MPRIV). The posting of this information (geolocation
and signature) to the semi-public ledger can be performed in multiple ways. For
example, the monitor can post the information directly to the semi-public ledger or
the monitor can send this information back to the truck which will then post it to
the semi-public ledger.
Under this cryptographic model (Fig 4.6), the monitors are not privy to the sup-
plier or the customer private information. Moreover, the external monitors cannot
read the semi-public ledger. Given that this ledger contains information about a large
number of shipments that are handled by numerous carriers, this additional restric-
tion prevents the monitors from mining the ledger for information that can be used
to infer sensitive trading patterns.
One challenge of the proposed approach is the reconciliation between the fact that
data in the sub-ledger will have high integrity (i.e., high level of trust). However, the
data in the semi-public ledger will have entries from external monitors and the ac-
curacy/truthfulness of these entries can vary. The goal is to develop high valued
information from these combined ledgers in order to approximate the current state of
the shipment. Let θ(t1) represent the actual state-geolocation and custody - of the
shipment at time t=t1. An ideal solution will deliver θ(t1) at time t1 to the supplier
and the customer. The problem is that this state is not directly available to them.
What these trading partners have are the original shipping documents, as well as un-
der the proposed framework information from the sub-ledger and semi-public ledger.
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The customer and supplier can analyze these ledgers and produce a ”view” - VIEW-
supplier(shipment, sub-ledger, semi-public ledger; t1) which closely approximates
θ(t1).
The proposed blockchain model is an initial contribution towards increasing the
validity of the information reported to the supplier and the customer from the field.
Additional research is needed to consolidate events from different monitors for a single
truck or multiple trucks within a close geographic location. Furthermore, approaches
that allow the efficient search of the semi-public ledger for a given truck-ID are needed.
Given the number of events in the semi-public ledger, this search may take a long
time if it is not supported by an adequate indexing mechanism.
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5. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION AND TESTING
The core and support processes of HP3D have been implemented on multiple com-
monly used platforms in order to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed design.
In addition, a GPS emulator was developed in order to allow the testing of the GPS
update process. Moreover, the applications for the nodes in the network, including the
administrative node, have also been implemented. This implementation was based on
Javascript and HTML for the presentation tier, MGO and Golang [32] for the middle
tier and MongoDB [33] for the data tier. This chapter discusses the details of this
implementation.
5.1 Data Structure
Processes in HP3D rely on messages that are exchanged by various components
of the system. There are two main types of messages, node request and shipment
update. The first type of messages is being exchanged between nodes and the index
server. The second type is exchanged among different nodes. The data structure used
to support the first type of messages is shown below:
type indexServer struct{
ReqType int
timestamp time
IpAddr string
key []byte
IMEI []byte
ID bson.ObjectId ‘bson: ‘‘_id,omitempty’’ ’
}
This structure is implemented in Golang and consists of six fields.
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• Reqtype is an integer value which defines the type of a request. The index server
checks this field first when a request is received.
– Reqtype 0 corresponds to the heartbeat message
– Reqtype 1 corresponds to an IP address query
– Reqtype 2 corresponds to the verification by using the IMEI number
• The timestamp field is a system time that is used for a Reqtype 1 request.
• The IPAddr field is a string that contains the IP address of a target node. If the
target node is not found or it is inactive an IP of 0.0.0.0 or 1.1.1.1 is returned
in the IPAddr field, respectively.
• The key and IMEI fields are byte arrays which are used in the mobile verification
routine.
• The ID field contains a node ID which is generated by the index server. The
ID is unique throughout the system. The ID is used to identify the IP address
of a particular node.
The data structure used to support the second type of messages (i.e., shipment
update) follows the EDI214 [34] standard. EDI214 is a global standard for supply
chain message exchange. The standard is complex and include information about
capital flow, contractual obligations and payment terms. It also involves several
other parties including manufacturers, assemblers, distributors, freight forwarders,
brokers, financial institutions, etc. For the purpose of this thesis we limit the trading
partners to the simple case of supplier, customer and carrier. Furthermore, we only
focus on the activity of truckload transportation. Truckload transportation refers to
activities associated with the physical distribution of shipments using trucks. Based
on this limited scope, a Golang data structure that aligns with the EDI 214 standard
is developed as follows:
type EDI214 struct{
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EnvelopDet EnvelopDetail
TCSSM TCSSMessage
EnvelopSum EnvelopSummary
}
type TCSSMessage struct{
THeading TCCSSMHeading
TDetail TCCSSMDetail
TSummary TCCSSMSummary
}
type TCCSSMDetail struct{
L1000 []Loop1000
L1100 []Loop1100
L1200 []Loop1200
L1300 []Loop1300
}
type Loop1100 struct{
AT7 string
MS1 string
MS2 string
M7 string
MS104 string
MS105 string
}
The TCSSMessage in EDI214 specifies the transportation carrier shipment status
and consists of a header, a footer and the record of the shipment status details (TCC-
SSMDetail). TCCSSMDetail has a specific structure and includes four loops labeled
Loop1000, Loop1100, Loop1200 and Loop1300. Loop1000 includes information such
41
as business instructions and lading handling requirements. Loop1100 specifies the
transportation carrier shipment status. Loop1200 covers the party’s basic informa-
tion (e.g., identification, address). Loop1300 is reserved for the order information
details.
In Loop1100 of EDI214, AT7 is a segment reserved for status details, MS1 is for
shipment location and MS2 identifies the owner. The timestamp is part of the AT7
segment and adhere to the X6 EDI code which refers to a shipment that is enroute
to the delivery location. For example, AT7=’“X6*NS***20170320*1125” refers to a
shipment with normal status (NS) on March 20th 2017 at 11:25 am. The codes MS104
(longitude) and MS105 (latitude) are used to capture the geolocation of the shipment
within the MS1 segment.
5.2 Software Components
The various software components of the proposed HP3D are shown in Fig 5.1 for
each of the index server, administrative node and regular node. The external monitor
components have not been implemented and remain for future work.
5.2.1 Index Server
The index server includes two tiers: a data tier which consists of a database
for storage of peer-related information and an application tier that can read and
update the database as well as manage the direction of information flow between the
server and the peers. MongoDB, a noSQL database, is used for the database. The
application tier uses MGO, a Golang-based driver, to interact with the database.
The index server is constantly active in order to receive and process requests from all
the nodes. The server invokes the function serverListen() shown below. In order to
listen for these incoming request on port 9999, the function serverListen() accepts a
connection when it occurs and makes a call to receiveMsg().
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Fig. 5.1. Software Components
The receiveMsg() function accepts a connection and extracts the data in the con-
nection using the format of the indexServer struct described in Section 5.1. The index
server will then check the Reqtype field in order to determine the request type and
invoke the corresponding function or operation.
• Reqtype 0: A heartbeat message which will trigger a local database update using
the ID field in the message and the current system time as the timestamp.
• Reqtype 1: It triggers a local database search as previously discussed in Chapter
4. The index server will reply to the requesting node with a indexServer struct
which contains an IP address in the IPAddr field. The field will contain 0.0.0.0
if the target node does not exist, 1.1.1.1 if the node is not active and a normal
IP address if the node exists and is currently active.
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Function serverListen()
1 ln,err = Listen(tcp, :9999)
2 if err != nil then
3 print err
end
4 while True do
5 c,err = ln.Accept()
6 if err != nil then
7 print err
8 continue
end
9 receiveMsg(c)
end
10 return
Algorithm 5.1. Server Listen Funtion
• Reqtype 2: This is the mobile verification routine. The verify() function shown
below is invoked in order to process this request.
The verify() function takes two arguments, the indexServer struct and a connec-
tion. The reason for the connection is that during the verification process the index
server and the node being verified need to exchange messages several times. There-
fore, the connection needs to be maintained until the verification routine is completed.
For testing purpose, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is used between the
index server and the node. As indicated in Section 3.1.4, the Diffie-Hellman protocol
is based a publicly known key, in this case P and g. In order to ensure the appropriate
security level and meet the requirement of the algorithm, these two parameters are
defined as bigInt. In the key exchange phase, the index server generates a random
number (random) in the range of 1 to p-1 and calculates myKey = grandom mod P.
Then based on the key sent by the node, the index server can calculate the secret
Key (secretKey). This key is used for the encryption/decryption of the IMEI number.
In order for the node to get the same secret key (secretKey), the index server sends
myKey back to the node. The node will reply with an encrypted IMEI number rep-
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Function receiveMsg(connection c)
1 indexServer message = c.getMessage()
2 indexServer result
3 if message.Reqtype ==0 then
4 message.timestamp = getSystemTime()
5 updateTime(message.ID,message.timestamp)
end
6 if message.Reqtype ==1 then
7 result = queryByCode(message.ID)
8 if result != nil then
9 result.IPAddr = 0.0.0.0
else
10 if result.timestamp - current time ¿ threshold then
11 result.IPAddr = 1.1.1.1
end
end
12 reply with result
end
13 if message.Reqtype ==2 then
verify(message, c)
end
14 return
Algorithm 5.2. Server Receive Message Funtion
resented as a byte array in the IMEI field of the message. The index server will then
use the secretKey to decrypt the IMEI number by invoking DESDecrypt(). Once, the
IMEI number is decrypted, the index server will search its local database. A node
ID is returned to the node if the IMEI number is pre-registered in the index server’s
database.
5.2.2 Peer
Peer applications have a three-tier architecture consisting of a presentation tier,
a middle tier and a data tier. The presentation tier consists of a local HTTP server
hosting a web application. The HTTP server is responsible for processing the user
requests and invoking the appropriate functions based on the request. The presen-
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Function verify(indexServer message, connection c)
1 bigInt random = random(1,P-1)
2 bigInt peerKey = bitInt(message.key)
3 bigInt myKey = grandom mod P
4 bigInt secretKey = peerKeyrandom mod P
5 message.key = myKey.toByteArray()
6 c.send(message)
7 message = c.getMessage()
8 string IMEI = DESDecrypt(message.IMEI,secretKey)
9 bool exist = queryIMEI(IMEI)
10 if exist then
11 message.ID = generateID()
12 c.send(message)
end
13 return
Algorithm 5.3. Verification Function Server Side
tation tier is implemented using HTML, CSS, JavaScript and the Go programming
language. The middle tier handles three main types processes:
• Query IP address: This is a support process which was described in Section 5.1.
The process is executed when a node wants the IP address of its partner nodes.
This information is needed, for instance to send the partner nodes updated
shipment information. The function QueryIP() takes the ID of the target node
in string format. Inside the function a new indexServer struct called request
is defined, and the Reqtype field is initialized to 1 indicating it is a query IP
request. The ID field is initialized to the ID of the target node. The node will
then dial the IP address of the index server on port 9999. This will establish
a connection with the index server and the node can send the request to the
index server. The index server will response with an indexServer struct which
includes an IP address. Finally, the function returns the IPAdd to the invoking
function. This process is used by two core processes: the GPS update process
and the internal sensor update process.
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• Internal sensor update process: This is a core process which was discussed in
Section 5.2. The node receives an internal sensor update message which is
generated by the administrative node. It will then update its local database
and broadcast the update message to all related nodes.
• GPS update process: This process is similar to the internal update message.
However, instead of receiving an internal sensor update message, the node re-
ceives a GPS update from the simulator. The local database of the node is
updated and all partner nodes are notified.
Function QueryIP(string ID)
1 indexServer request
2 request.Reqtype = 1
3 requst.ID = toObjectID(ID)
4 c = net.Dial(tcp, Index:9999) // Index is the IP address of index server
5 c.send(request)
6 request = c.getMessage()
7 string IPAdd = request.IPAddr
8 return IPAdd
Algorithm 5.4. Query IP Address
In order to receive the internal sensor update message from the administrative
node, a given node has to listen on port 9995 as shown in Algorithm 5.5. The
receiveSensorMsg will then be invoked once a new connection is received. The node
will extract the incoming message from the connection using the struct EDI214 as
defined in Section 5.1. The node will first update its local database and then send
the update to other nodes. A while loop is used to broadcast the message to all
nodes that are involved in the same shipment in a sequential manner. The EDI214
struct contains the information of all nodes in the L1200 which is an array since there
are usually multiple nodes participating in a shipment. Since the administrative node
participates in all the shipments that involve the associated company, the information
related to the administrative node is also included as an element in L1200. The
extractID() function extracts the node information by accessing each element of the
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Function InternalUpdateListen()
1 ln,err = Listen(tcp, :9995)
2 if err != nil then
3 print err
end
4 while True do
5 c,err = ln.Accept()
6 if err != nil then
7 print err
8 continue
end
9 receiveSensorMsg(c)
end
10 return
Function receiveSensorMsg(connection c)
11 EDI214 message = c.getMessage()
12 updateDatabase(message)
13 while i=0 to length(message.TSSM.L1200) do
14 string ID = extractID(message.TSSM.TDetail.L1200[i])
15 string IPAddr= QueryIP(ID)
16 if IPAddr != 0.0.0.0 & IPAddr != 1.1.1.1 then
17 c = net.Dial(tcp, IPAddr:9999)
c.send(message)
end
end
18 return
Algorithm 5.5. Internal Sensor Update
L1200 array and for each node, the QueryIP() function is called in order to obtain
the corresponding IP address from the index server. If the returned IP address is
valid, the updated message is sent to the target node.
The GPS update function is shown in Algorithm 5.6. It uses port 9996 to re-
ceive a GPS update from the GPS emulator. The message sent by the GPS emulator
is in string format. It contains the longitude, latitude, TruckID and a timestamp.
In order to extract the information separately, few functions are called such as ex-
tractTruckID(). After the information is extracted, a local database search function
getAllShipment() is called. Since there may be multiple shipments in one truck, this
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Function GPSListen()
1 ln,err = Listen(tcp, :9996)
2 if err != nil then
3 print err
end
4 while True do
5 c,err = ln.Accept()
6 if err != nil then
7 print err
8 continue
end
9 receiveGPSMsg(c)
end
10 return
Function receiveGPSMsg(connection c)
11 string GPSmessage = c.getMessage()
12 string TruckID = extractTruckID(GPSmessage)
13 string timestamp =extractTime(GPSmessage)
14 string long = extractLongitude(GPSmessage)
15 string lat = estractLatitude(GPSmessage)
16 EDI214 allShipment [] = getAllShipment(TrcukID)
17 while i=0 to length(allShipment) do
18 allShipment[i].TCSSM.TDetail.L1100[0].AT7 =X6*NS*+timestamp
19 allShipment[i].TCSSM.TDetail.L1100[0].MS2 = TruckID
20 allShipment[i].TCSSM.TDetail.L1100[0].MS104 = long
21 allShipment[i].TCSSM.TDetail.L1100[0].MS105 =lat
22 updateDatabase(allShipment[i])
23 while j=0 to length(allShipment[i].TSSM.L1200) do
24 string ID = allShipment[i].TSSM.L1200[j]
25 string IPAddr= QueryIP(ID)
26 if IPAddr != 0.0.0.0 & IPAddr != 1.1.1.1 then
27 c = net.Dial(tcp, IPAddr:9999)
c.send(message)
end
end
28
end
29 return
Algorithm 5.6. GPS update
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function returns an array of all shipments that are being carried by the truck with
the specified TruckID. For each shipment in the array, GPS update (Algorithm 5.6) is
executed. In the EDI214 struct, Loop1100 contains the details of the shipment status
where code AT7 specifies the timestamp, longitude and latitude. The function will
also send an update message to all other nodes in the shipment-centric sub-network
by first invoking the QueryIP() function to get the IP address of the target nodes
and sending them the message through a TCP connection.
A peer cannot only receive messages from both GPS simulator and administrative
node, but also receive messages from other peers through port 9999. Algorithm 5.7
shows the receive message function from other peers. This function is used by all peers
in the network including the administrative node. Once a new update is received, the
receiveUpdate() function is called in order to update the corresponding field in the
local database.
Function PeerListen()
1 ln,err = Listen(tcp, :9999)
2 if err != nil then
3 print err
end
4 while True do
5 c,err = ln.Accept()
6 if err != nil then
7 print err
8 continue
end
9 receiveUpdate(c)
end
10 return
Function receiveUpdate(connection c)
11 EDI214 message = c.getMessage()
12 updateDatabase(message)
13 return
Algorithm 5.7. Peer Listen and Update Functions
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The mobile verification routine is shown in algorithm 5.8. As discussed in the
verify() function associated with the index server, the verification process is initiated
by the peer. The peer generates a random number random. Based on the number
random, a MobileKey can be generated by performing grandom mod P where P and g
are pre-defined public parameters. The server will process the request and reply with
a server key, serverKey. A secret key is calculated based on random and serverKey.
The peer will then retrieve its IMEI number in a string format and encrypt it using
secretKey and the DES encryption algorithm. The encrypted IMEI number verReq
will be sent to the server. An ID is returned by the server if the mobile device is an
authorized device.
Function verifyMobile()
1 indexServer verReq
2 verReq.Reqtype = 2
3 bigInt random = random(1,P-1)
4 bigInt MobileKey = grandom mod P
5 verReq.key = MobileKey.toByteArray()
6 c = net.Dial(tcp, Index:9999) // Index is the IP address of index server
7 c.send(verReq)
8 verReq = c.getMessage()
9 bigInt serverKey = bigInt(verReq.key)
10 bigInt secretKey = serverKeyrandom mod P
11 string IMEI = getIMEI()
12 verReq.IMEI = DESEncrypt(IMEI,secretKey)
13 c.send(verReq)
14 verReq =c.getMessage()
15 ID = verReq.ID
16 return
Algorithm 5.8. Verification Function Peer Side
5.3 Testing Scenario
The test environment consists of four computers, three of them represent the three
parties in a shipment-centric sub-network, namely carrier, supplier and customer.
The fourth node represents the index server. An Android based GPS emulator is also
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used to test the GPS update process. Moreover, the mobile verification routine is
tested by using an Android based mobile phone and the above fourth machine as the
index server. We assigned static IP addresses and several parameters were predefined
including the parameters P and g which are used for the mobile verification scenario.
Scenario 1: Heart beat message. Fig 5.2 shows the data being exchanged during
the heartbeat message between the index server and the three nodes. The heart
beat message rate was set to 30 seconds. The message being transferred is in the
indexServer format. For illustration purpose, only the ID field is shown in the graph
since this is the only field being used.
Fig. 5.2. Heartbeat Message Testing Scenario
Scenario 2: GPS update. Fig 5.3 shows the GPS emulator sending a GPS update
to the carrier. This message is then forwarded to both customer and supplier. This
scenario also shows how the query IP address process is used by the carrier to obtain
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the IP addresses of the customer and the supplier. The GPS emulator sends a GPS
update event to the carrier in string format that is separated by commas. The carrier
can extract the update information from the string including, the TruckID, longitude
(Long), latitude (Lat) and a timestamp. The longitude and latitude is generated by
the GPS sensor in the mobile device in decimal representation. The carrier retrieves
all shipments’ information. Based on this information, the carrier can query the
index server about other trading partners’ IP addresses, then send them the updated
message in the fields EDI214 format. Fig 5.3 shows the content of the updated
message in the EDI214 format. As indicated before, Loop1100 contains the updated
information in AT7, MS2, MS104 and MS105. The customer and the supplier will
update their respective databases when they receive the message using the update()
function.
Fig. 5.3. GPS Update Testing Scenario
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Fig 5.4 shows the mobile verification routine scenario. The process begins with
the mobile device sending an indexServer struct labeled message to the index server.
The Key field in message contains a number that is generated by the mobile device
based on the public parameter P and g. The index server receives the message and
generates a number Y using the same public parameter and calculates the secret
key based on the number received and the random number Y. The index server
sends another number back to the mobile device in order to enable the creation of
the secret key. The mobile device encrypts its IMEI number and stores in a byte
array message.IMEI and sends to the index server. The index server decrypts it and
searches for the IMEI number in its database. Then sends back an ID to the mobile
device if the IMEI number is valid.
Fig. 5.4. Mobile Device Testing Scenario
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6. CONCLUSION
The proposed framework is the foundation for a dynamic, resilient and scalable sup-
ply chain digital system that can provide trading partners with total visibility in the
distribution phase. We believe that total visibility in the distribution phase is the
most difficult to achieve and the one with the highest impact on the efficiency of
the end-to-end supply chain. However, we also anticipate additional extensions and
improvements that can enhance the maturity of the proposed system and extend its
functionalities. For instance, the proposed blockchain model and in particular the
semi-public ledger need to be fully implemented and tested. A potential implementa-
tion will store the semi-public ledge in the database of the monitors, index server and
peers. MongoDB is a good choice for the blockchain data structure since the messages
being transmitted between the parties use the JSON format which is compatible with
MongoDB.
All partners that are involved in the network must have public/private key pairs.
These keys are denoted Cuspub, Cuspriv for the customer. Similarly, the key pairs for
the supplier, carrier and external monitor are denoted Supub, Supriv, Capub, Capriv,
Expub and Expriv, respectively. The external monitor uses Expriv to sign each moni-
toring event it generates before posting it to the semi-public ledger. The other parties
can then verify the monitoring events using Expub. The key pair for external monitors
can be generated when the monitors register with the index server. Furthermore, for
better security and message integrity, these key pairs should be updated periodically.
Potentially, key pairs may be generated on a daily-basis. The encryption of the mes-
sages can be implemented using popular public key encryption/signature mechanism
such as RSA [20] or ECDSA [24].
A second enhancement is with respect to the distribution of keys among carrier
supplier and customer. In order to exchange custody events, the trading partners
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have to use key pairs. These key pairs can be generated in two ways. Under the first
option, the key pairs are generated when the trading partners join the network based
on credentials that are provided by each partner. The key pairs can then be updated
periodically in order to maintain the security level of the keys. Every time a shipment
is initiated, all parties can share their public keys with the other partners involved in
the shipment. These keys are then used to encrypt the message that is shared among
the partners. The method is easy to implement since the key pair only needs to be
generated once and can be reused for different shipments. Nevertheless, the custody
update information will have to be re-encrypt few times when it is sent to different
parties, since these parties have different key pairs. For instance if a message is
encrypted by Supub, the message can only be decrypted by Supriv. Therefore, in order
to share information among different parties while maintaining data confidentiality,
the message needs to be re-encrypt using Supub ,Cupub and Capub and sent to supplier,
customer and carrier, respectively.
The second option takes advantage of the physical contract signing process. A new
key pair can be generated every time a new contract is signed. An optical key can be
created during this process. Under this option, the customer, carrier and supplier will
have the same key pairs for a given shipment. The key will expire when the shipment
is completed. The key pair may be stored in the sub-ledger for future validation
purposes. Computationally, this option eliminates the need for re-encryption of the
custody events as was required for the first option. However, it suffers from the
overhead associated with the generation of the key pair. Selecting the appropriate
option depends on the computation speed of the underlying encryption method.
A third area for future work is with respect to the mobile application. A verifi-
cation routine was developed to verify that the mobile device is valid. In addition,
the application needs to be able to establish a connection and capture the GPS co-
ordinates of the trucks for the external monitors. Other enhancements to the mobile
application include a bar code/QR code scanner in order to automate the scanning
of codes associated with the shipment.
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In conclusion, this thesis investigates the limitations of current supply chain man-
agement systems and proposes a new event-based hybrid peer-to-peer framework that
support pseudo real-time transparency in the physical distribution phase of the sup-
ply chain. The proposed framework is a departure from the traditional centralized
transaction-based supply chain management systems.
A prototype of the proposed framework was implemented. The index server ap-
plication was built using Golang. It is responsible for the storage and distribution
of peer information. The peer application is web-based and was implemented using
HTML, Golang, Javascript and MongoDB. In order to improve the security level of
the proposed framework, a blockchain model was also introduced. This model consists
of a semi-public ledger which is maintained by external monitors and includes infor-
mation related to the geolocation of trucks. The proposed model also relies on private
sub-ledgers, where each sub-ledger is associated with a given shipment and is only
accessible to the trading partners involved in the shipment. The main contribution
of this thesis is the development of a distributed architecture to enable the sharing
of reliable field information among trading partners during the physical distribution
phase of the supply chain. The innovative features of this architecture include the use
of a peer-to-peer communication model with mechanisms for privacy and reliability
that are needed to support commercial applications.
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